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Public faces? 
A critical exploration of the diffusion of face recognition technologies in online 
social networks* 
 
Introduction: Framing diffusion 
Initial “governmental” applications for border control and eGovernment services 
will give way in the future to a wider use of biometrics for commercial and civil 
applications. We have termed this “the diffusion effect”, arising from an increased 
acceptance of biometric identification by citizens in their dealings with 
governments (Maghiros et al., 2005: 7). 
Over the last decade, we have witnessed a rapid spread of biometric technologies from 
the security domain to commercial and social media applications. The use of fingerprint 
scanning to gain access to mobile devices, voice biometrics by banking services, palm 
vein solutions for access to buildings, and face recognition on social media sites are just 
some examples of the growing use of biometrics in everyday life. This diffusion has 
been nurtured globally by governments and the biometrics industry (Stahl, 2011) and is 
treated as having undeniably positive implications: proponents suggest that the use of 
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biometrics, “can deliver improved convenience and value to individuals” (Maghiros et 
al., 2005: 10). 
 In this article we critically examine the diffusion of biometric technologies, 
focusing on face recognition. In order to do this, we use Nissenbaum’s (2010) 
framework of contextual integrity to reveal the context-specific informational norms for 
biometrics in security and policing. In focusing on recent uses of biometrics in social 
media applications, we extend Nissenbaum’s work to the study of how informational 
norms move and are reshaped across contexts following the diffusion of new 
technologies. We argue that as face recognition has been iterated over time in wider 
contexts, the informational norms that have been developed around initial contexts of 
use – in security and policing - have inadvertently been incorporated into everyday 
practices, influencing the way users understand biometrics and their wider use. To fully 
grasp the repercussions of the convergence between Web 2.0 (Braman, 2011), 
especially social network sites (SNS), and face recognition technologies (FRTs), we 
analyze the debate around Facebook’s use of face recognition software for on-line photo 
management, seeking to disclose the historically contingent conditions for the use of 
face recognition. Making these conditions visible, we argue, may enable citizens to see 
things differently in order to start debating their privacy concerns in a language that will 
incorporate a broader array of issues than is the case today.  
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 Our approach departs from existing academic accounts of biometrics that treat 
biometrics as a means of securitizing everyday life (Bigo, 2002). By rendering bodies 
into easily governable entities (Magnet, 2011), the gaze of the state over its population 
is expanded, citizens’ relationship with the state altered (Agamben 2004:169), and 
techniques usually reserved for criminals are deployed in the governance of entire 
populations. Approaches such as these paint a dystopian picture of the uses of 
biometrics. Based on Foucault’s reading of the Panopticon, the paradigm of 
“surveillance” emphasizes the ever-present state observing our every move. As a result, 
it ignores shifts in the uses of these technologies and fails to take note of how the 
diffusion of technology across different contexts, particularly in new media, impacts on 
the use and meaning of that technology.1  
The focus on diffusion enables us to explore what happens when norms 
developed in the contexts of emergence migrate to new contexts of use that lack clearly 
established rules of transmission for the information generated by new technologies. If 
meaning is use – as Wittgenstein suggests – we need to be clear about how technologies 
are used, and how their uses are introduced, understood, argued for and extended to new 
contexts. We suggest a fine-grained analysis of diffusion that focuses upon the iteration 
of technologies in different contexts. Iteration here implies both repetition and 
alteration.2 In being repeated, in different contexts and in different media, the meanings 
associated with a particular practice will bear the traces of earlier contexts of use, and 
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will be altered by being inserted into a new context of use. Starting from the supposition 
that the meanings and practices associated with a given domain – in this case, face 
recognition technology - enable those who subscribe to it ‘to interpret bits of 
information and put them together into coherent stories’ or narratives that shape, but 
does not determine further use (Howarth, 2000: 101-2), we reconstructed the horizon of 
intelligibility (Norval, 2007: 105) accompanying the initial emergence and use of face 
recognition. To establish the contours of the contexts of emergence, we collected 
reports on biometrics from the US Department of Homeland Security, the UK Cabinet 
Office, the Home Office, as well as committees from both UK Houses of Parliament, 
EU commissioned reports, industry white papers and promotional materials, and think 
tank reports. We thematically coded (Saldaña, 2009) this material to identify key 
framings of biometrics in industry and policy publications. We then compared these 
framings to views expressed and also thematically coded in academic literature and civil 
society and press reports on biometrics, surveillance, and privacy (Norval & 
Prasopoulou, 2013). Each theme was populated with representative quotes from our 
primary material. This methodology also allowed us to identify key actors in biometrics 
in security, policing and social media, and uncover informational norms governing 
practices in the contexts of emergence and iteration we examined (Norval & 
Prasopoulou, 2013). It also enabled us to see how meanings and practices (including 
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informational norms) are repeated and altered as the technology migrates from security 
contexts to everyday use in new media.  
The framing of FRT in law and regulation, government documents, policy 
proposals and investigations, as well as their representation in industry outlets matters, 
for it establishes horizons of intelligibility that set limits to what could be said and done 
with them. Once well-established, such horizons incorporate practices of governance 
that guide conduct and set norms of legitimate use on the one hand, and practices of 
freedom, questioning and challenging existing rules of the game on the other (Tully, 
2008: 23; Griggs, Norval & Wagenaar, 2014).3 Given this, we analyzed the ways in 
which existing as well as emerging practices of governance seek to provide shape and 
give meaning to FRTs. We also investigate the new opportunities for doing things 
differently that are opened up by their diffusion from one set of contexts to another. 
This is particularly clear in the use of FRT by Facebook, as it marks one of the first 
deployments of a technology emerging from a security context in social media. 
Our focus on iteration across contexts makes visible important aspects of the 
repetition and alteration of meanings associated with social practices.  It serves as a 
critical tool to address the circumstances under which iterations become problematic, 
and provides an important deepening of contextually-driven approaches to privacy. 
Nissenbaum’s work on contextual integrity focuses on breaches in institutionalized 
practices of transmitting information. It does so by analyzing informational norms in 
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terms of four key parameters, namely, ‘contexts’, including “structured social settings 
characterized by canonical activities”); ‘actors’, incorporating senders and recipients of 
information but also information subjects; ‘information attributes’, describing the types 
of information in question; and, finally ‘transmission principles’, which outline the 
terms and conditions under which information is transmitted from one party to another 
in a specific context (2010: 132). This approach enables in-depth analysis of privacy 
norms and accompanying expectations in any social context. It facilitates identification 
of the roots of bewilderment and protests against new digital technologies in the name 
of privacy by focusing on alarm caused when contextual norms are violated by new 
technologies (2010:3). However, it does not account for new social practices emerging 
with the growing integration of digital media in different walks of life (i.e. contexts) as 
a result of the diffusion of technologies into new contexts. After setting the scene with a 
discussion of the contexts of emergence of FRTs, we analyze Facebook’s use of the “tag 
tool” for photo management as a case of iteration in a new context. To this end, we use 
the key parameters suggested by Nissenbaum in our analysis of the diffusion of 
biometrics from security and policing to social media. Our intention is to broaden the 
discussion of contextual integrity by showing how diffusion of new technologies in 
contexts without settled informational norms can have unacknowledged consequences 
arising from the initial context in which they emerge.  
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Contexts of emergence: Tracing the face  
The face is a site of negotiation (Benjamin, Howard, & Townsend, 2011: 1). 
There is a long history of normative engagement with the face (Waldenfels 2002: 63-81; 
Edkins, 2013a; 2013b). However, as Chamayou (2013, footnote 7) argues “beneath the 
face of a Levinas we occasionally find the face of a Bertillon.” Current developments of 
facial biometrics suggest that this is more than occasionally the case. In what follows 
we systematically analyze discursive framings of FRT in governmental and industry 
discourses, so as to be able to understand the particular meanings given to facial 
biometrics in different contexts and by different actors. It is important to note that these 
framings are not simply a given set of discrete, isolated statements but rather a 
discursive horizon that shapes and sets limits to what can be done within a given terrain 
(author, 2000, 2009). On this account, FRTs are not neutral techniques deployed for the 
purposes of identity management. Much depends upon the precise meanings attributed 
to, and practices associated with them (Howarth 2000), by a wide range of actors, 
including governments, commercial and civil society organizations (Schmidt and 
Cohen, 2013:56). The framing of facial biometrics in a seminal EU Frontex technical 
report, entitled “Biometrics for Border Security” is exemplary of much governmental 
and industry discourse. It traces out what purports to be a “natural” path in the diffusion 
of facial biometrics: 
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The face is the most natural of the biometric modalities and this is how humans 
recognize individuals in their immediate social environment. This traditional 
biometric method is performed manually by comparing the actual individual with 
an image stored in the human brain memory. An extension of this natural 
identifying process done officially is when a person is identified comparing his 
face to an image stored in an identifying document (e.g. ID or traditional passport) 
by some authority. Biometric face recognition works by using a computer to 
analyse the subject’s facial structure... Using all of this information, the program 
creates a unique template incorporating all of the numerical data. This template 
may then be compared to very large databases of facial images to identify the 
subject (Vakalis et al., 2006: 26). 
There are a number of key moments of transition in this account of diffusion: the first is 
the transition from “natural,” “original,” processes of recognition, to the traditional 
methods of biometric identification; and the second from traditional to digitized 
biometric face recognition. The narrative structure of the text first encourages the reader 
to move seamlessly from recognition to identification: from a practice of social and 
personal interaction, to a bureaucratized, institutional practice of control, instituting new 
relations between the person (the data subject), image and the agency (here the state) 
exercising the comparison. The second transition introduces a further complexity: with 
digitized biometric face recognition, we have not just a comparison of a person with 
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his/her picture, but the comparison of a template to a number of other templates on a 
large database (Lips, Taylor and Organ, 2009; Whitley, Gal and Kjærgaard, 2014).  
While using the face as a means of identification has many historical precedents 
(Caplan and Torpey, 2001), the narrative suggests that there is little difference between 
these practices. Social recognition, identification from a photograph, and identification 
and comparison by using data templates are treated as mere extensions of “natural 
processes”. Notably, the latter is re-described as a “traditional biometric method” that 
“is performed manually by comparing the actual individual with an image stored in the 
human brain memory.” Social practices of recognition are thus reduced to a mechanical 
vision of the performance of the “manual” task of “comparing” “the actual individual” 
with “an image stored in the human brain memory.” The process of turning a person’s 
face into a biometric template is portrayed as analogous to what we do in everyday 
social interactions: human recognition purportedly is just a practice of judging whether 
we know a face by comparing measurements and features in our head. The fact that 
biometric FRTs allows for large scale comparison of templates held on big databases is 
depicted as a simple further extension of a natural of processes; we are not told to which 
databases our templates are being compared nor is there acknowledgement of the 
immense possibilities of tracing that is opened up by turning the face into a machine 
readable algorithm. 
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The document further notes the key factors in favor of adopting face biometrics 
for machine readable travel documents (Vakalis et al., 2006:12):  
▪ Facial photographs only disclose information that the person routinely 
discloses to the general public; 
▪ The use of a photograph for identification is already socially and culturally 
accepted; 
▪ It is non-intrusive; 
▪ It does not require new and costly enrollment procedures to be introduced; 
▪ Many countries have a legacy database of facial images captured as part of the 
digitized production of passport photographs; 
▪ It can be captured from an endorsed photograph, not requiring the person to by 
physically present, including children; 
▪ For watch lists, the face (photograph) is generally the only biometric available 
for comparison; 
▪ It generally works when acquiring a facial image by a camera; 
▪ Human verification of the biometric against the photograph/person is 
relatively simple and a familiar process for border control authorities. 
These reasons display both the more general conditions of emergence of the use of 
biometric technologies in government and industry discourses – particularly the 
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emphasis on security - and reflect the technical arguments for the uses of biometrics for 
identification (e.g. Maghiros et al., 2005), emphasizing the historical continuity of face-
related identification practices, and framing them as simple technological upgrades (e.g. 
NSTC, 2006).  
 A number of dislocatory events, including 9/11 in the USA, Madrid 2004 and 
the 7/7 London bombings, led to a wider diffusion of biometrics, justified by arguments 
that biometrics provide security and protection in the post 9/11 world, that it enhances 
migration control, facilitates economic growth,4 and ease of movement; and that it 
contributes to better government services (see Maghiros et al., 2006). Given the ever 
closer co-operation between governmental organizations and the biometrics industry,5 it 
is not surprising that the industry repeats many of the arguments around security. 
However, there are also notable differences. A shift from security to safety adds an 
emphasis on technological innovation in addition to the need to safeguard society, 
secure identity and protect personal data through the body “as the only reliable 
password” visible in arguments justifying FRTs.  
The step-change in the introduction of digitized biometrics is covered over by 
statements that suggest a simple continuity with normal social practices: we “routinely” 
disclose our faces to the general public. Disregarding the fact that the “naturalness” of 
facial biometrics is highly contestable in a multi-cultural context where faces and their 
presentation in public are deeply politicized, the assumption is that once these steps are 
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naturalized, the further extension of facial biometrics becomes easier and seemingly 
obvious. One such further, very significant, change concerns the movement from using 
facial biometrics to identify individuals and to compare them to watch-lists and other 
databases, to what is known as “remote biometrics.” The argument in “Biometrics for 
Border Security” continues: 
The technology exists today for cameras to scan a crowd, matching faces against a 
database of known terrorists and criminals and has many promising applications, 
including fast, positive identification of airline passengers, access control for 
personnel, and crowd screening … because a person’s face can be captured by a 
camera from some distance away, facial recognition has a clandestine or covert 
capability (i.e. the subject does not necessarily know he/she has been observed) 
(Vakalis et al., 2006: 26). 
This argument repeats the security narrative, as well as familiar technical justifications, 
both of which are familiar tropes in industry and government discourses on biometrics 
(Cohen, 2012; Accenture 2013). Yet, another twist is introduced: the clandestine uses 
and covert capabilities of biometrics where the subject is not aware of being observed. 
Counter to good practice (Biometrics Institute, 2013), this extension seeks to naturalize 
the use of biometrics without the subject’s consent. 
The long-standing use of the face in government identity schemes in tandem 
with a tightly knit argument framing face recognition as imitating normal brain activity 
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(Safran, 2015) during identification, propelled its development far beyond security and 
policing applications. The range of commercial and other uses are constantly evolving 
(see Schmidt and Cohen 2008:38). For many, the most alarming use of FRT is in online 
social networks (Acquisti et al., 2014). It is for this reason that Facebook is an excellent 
case to trace how elements of the horizon of intelligibility elaborated by governments 
and the biometrics industry are reworked when entering everyday life. Its “tag 
suggestions” tool allows us to explore if and how accepted informational norms are 
breached, and how this is publicly justified and contested, if at all.  
 
Contexts of iteration: The use of face recognition by Facebook 
Facebook introduced face recognition to improve the way users manage pictures 
uploaded on their profiles. The “tag suggestion” tool uses FRT to identify human faces 
in each picture and suggest names for the user to easily tag them.6 Indicative of a 
growing sense of face recognition as something already normalized in social practices 
Facebook opted for a fast roll-out without discussing the technology that enables tag 
suggestions; there were no special announcements, just a blog enthusiastically 
describing the new possibilities opened up by the tool, portraying it as enhancing 
convenience and improving customer experience by facilitating the curation of digital 
content:  
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Unlike photos that get forgotten in a camera or an unshared album, tagged photos 
help you and your friends relive everything from that life-altering skydiving trip 
to a birthday dinner where the laughter never stopped.7 
Privacy advocates were and remain critical of how Facebook introduced face 
recognition (see Hargittai, 2010; and Fernback and Papacharissi, 2007: 730).8 Civil 
society organizations in the U.S. filed a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission,9 
alleging that Facebook engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices.10 Spearheading 
the complaint, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) put it thus: 
Facebook routinely encourages users to “tag,” i.e. provide actual identifying 
information about themselves, their friends, and other people they may recognize. 
Facebook "associate[s] the tags with [a user’s] account, compare what these 
tagged photos have in common and store a summary of this comparison." 
Facebook automatically compares uploaded photos “to the summary information 
we’ve stored about what your tagged photos have in common." Facebook gave no 
notice to users and failed to obtain consent prior to collecting "Photo Comparison 
Data," generating unique biometric identifiers, and linking biometric identifiers 
with individual users. 
In his opening statement to the Fourth US Senate Hearing of the Subcommittee on 
Privacy, Technology and the Law (2012), Franken (2012) highlighted the issues raised 
by the use of FRT: 
 16 
Once someone has your faceprint, they can get your name, they can find your 
social networking account and they can find and track you in the street, in the 
stores you visit … Your face is a conduit to an incredible amount of information 
about you. And facial recognition technology can allow others to access all of that 
information from a distance, without your knowledge. 
Facebook’s response to its critics has been evocative of core arguments in government 
and industry discourse. Users are assumed not to have objections to the use of 
biometrics once they find a service useful and enjoyable. As Facebook’s Manager of 
Privacy and Public Policy argued in his testimony to the U.S. Senate (Sherman, 2012): 
Facebook is committed to building innovative tools that enhance people’s online 
experiences while giving them control over their personal information. Our 
integration of facial recognition technology into tag suggestions on Facebook 
exemplifies this commitment.  
Evoking the idea of privacy-by-design,11 Facebook positioned the tag-suggestion tool as 
a service that enhances privacy, encouraging users to disclose data. Users, it argues, are 
in control of their data and can choose whether they want to be identified in their 
friends’ photos:  
When people share photos on Facebook, our online audience selectors enable 
them to determine with precision the audience with whom the photos will be 
shared (Sherman 2012). 
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Indeed, Facebook’s arguments are intelligible because they iterate understandings of 
face recognition methodically developed by governments and the biometrics industry. 
The idea of innovation, so predominant in Facebook’s rhetoric, is central to the 
diffusion of biometrics (Accenture 2013) and fits perfectly with its corporate strategy of 
investing in technologies that ostensibly enhances human connectivity.12   
 However, these frames obscure significant privacy-related issues raised by the 
convergence of FRT and online social networks. It is here that tension arises between 
informational norms in security uses and social media. As Barocas and Nissenbaum 
(2014: 47) note, “computing and information technologies have been radically 
disruptive, allowing information practices that frequently diverge from entrenched 
informational norms.” The capacity to create biometric databases of digitized faces 
originating from photos uploaded on Facebook, and aggregating this information with 
data from the users’ activity, is a case in point.13 These digitized faces become a new 
information type that irrevocably links identity with personal history, setting this 
application apart from other uses of face recognition. These developments challenge 
both existing norms around the use of personal photographs, departing from situations 
in which normally only one’s closest friends would know one’s activities and 
preferences, and not in the detail recorded by Facebook, and introducing new 
information types. They also change existing transmission principles. The tag tool 
affects the information flow of photographs. Rather than being at the behest of the data 
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subject (the person uploading the photograph), they now become the object of 
secondary disclosures (disclosures by others), leading to new privacy – and reputational 
– concerns (Martin and del Alamo, 2016: 251). Indicative of the unacknowledged 
consequences and breaches of informational norms, these issues arise from the diffusion 
of biometric technologies into everyday practices, in the context of societies in which 
almost every aspect of our lives produce recordable data.14  
 
The unacknowledged consequences of diffusion 
The acquisition of on-line photo sharing sites by large social media companies such as 
Facebook and Google allowed face recognition to tap into an ever evolving on-line 
depository of user generated content that is not regulated by governments.15 Joseph 
Atick (2011) likens this situation to a perfect storm where unprecedented convergence 
of several technological developments creates an environment where new kinds of face 
recognition applications threaten privacy on a very large scale. Given this it is important 
to reflect on why the biometrics industry treated the diffusion as trivial (Safran, n.d.), 
but also why, despite legal challenges, users did not reacted against it as strongly as 
with other FRTs such as Google Glass. It is here that attention to the diffusion of 
framings from their initial contexts of emergence clearly comes into play. One of the 
main reasons why this was not foreseen is to be found in the sedimentation of 
arguments on the neutrality of biometrics that made the biometrics industry myopic to 
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the controversial combination of face biometrics, social media and large scale use of 
personal data. This could also explain the privacy paradox (Taddicken 2014): why 
people use these technologies and disclose personal information despite concerns raised 
by privacy and civil rights groups, and unease expressed by users (Martin and del 
Alamo, 2016: 251). It is plausible that user understanding of face recognition is indeed 
mediated by the available frames, and is being perceived as an automation of practices 
of identification we “have been doing all along” as suggested in government and 
industry framings, and that the disclosure of personal information is increasingly seen as 
a normal part of modern life (Ellias, 2014). Contributing to this line of thought is the 
rhetoric in favor of privacy-by-design adopted by those involved in the development 
and use of biometrics (Federal Trade Commission, 2012) ostensibly ensuring that the 
personal data collected through biometrics is safely stored and not used in contexts 
other than that in which it was collected. These technologies are framed as rigidly 
regulated by governments and trade associations to safeguard individual privacy.16 As a 
result, users may feel safe to use face recognition in social media, falsely reassured by 
the idea that benign contexts should not allow for malevolent uses.17 
However, the Facebook tag tool shows that matters are considerably more 
complicated than users may assume. Privacy is not safeguarded simply by respecting 
traditional privacy requirements and practices. As technologies cross contexts, new 
social practices are developed and it is difficult to trace the direction of these changes 
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and to develop appropriate new privacy regulations (cf. n.a. 2007, pages 1870-91; 
Koops, Hildebrandt & Jaquet-Chiffelle (2010-11: 497-561). As Introna and Nissenbaum 
note, FRT disrupts normalized flows of information “by connecting facial images with 
identity” and “connecting this with whatever other information is held in a system’s 
database” (Introna & Nissenbaum, 2009: 44). This is why, in the context of social 
media, attention to informational norms is so important. The critical issue in the case of 
Facebook is not just whether or not face recognition should be an opt-in service, 
suggesting an unproblematic incorporation of biometric technology in social media. 
Central to the case is the convergence of social media, digital photography and 
biometrics in a rapidly growing database qua archive which is up-for-grabs by anybody. 
Yet, the transmission principles agreed between Facebook and its users, upon 
registration to the platform, make no provision for consent to the creation of new 
information types (biometric databases of photos). The prevailing context of a 
generalized archive consisting of public images, supplemented by personal 
photographic archives allowing people to position themselves as they choose (Sekula, 
1986), is rapidly being transformed into a public archive where everybody can see 
everybody. Existing widely-agreed, information types and transmission rules stipulating 
the use of public and private photographic archives are altered to the extent that quite 
frequently all the actors involved are not fully known either, yet these fundamental 
changes in the moral economy of the image as well as its role in identification - formal 
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and informal – remain unaccounted for in current framings. Face recognition 
contributes to this change by lifting anonymity from the part of the archive that was 
previously expected to be private,18 making everybody a public face. As FRT algorithms 
transform faces into unique data templates, creating new information types, they 
contribute not only to the success of face recognition in photo management, but to other 
new uses, such as those associated with remote face recognition. As a result, the 
identification of faces that can take place even in pictures where faces are not 
photographed in a standardized way (Sekula 1986), opens up new forms and 
possibilities of transmission, often without the information subject’s consent. 
As noted above, not only is the place of the sender and recipient of photographs 
altered, and with it the prevailing norms of publicity, but new actors and novel, 
unacknowledged principles of transmission disrupting existing norms of information 
flows, are coming into being. Every aspect of contextual integrity is altered in some 
way: the boundaries between existing public and private uses of photographs are 
altered; information subjects no longer have exclusive control over the dissemination of 
their images; secondary disclosure and disclosers enter the scene; and data linkages 
create new information attributes with multiple and unregulated new possibilities of 
transmission and use. All of these demand new ways to think about and implement 
privacy-protective practices. 
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Traditionally questions relating to information recipients and the principles 
governing the transmission of data, if addressed at all, have been framed through 
established mechanisms of notice and consent, which are no longer adequate given the 
possibilities of data moving from one context to another in unacknowledged and largely 
unregulated ways.19 Contestation of these new deployments has involved legal action, 
governmental attempts to regulate the new uses, and some citizen wariness.20 In the case 
of Facebook, reactions have focused on the thin conception of user consent (given that it 
treated the introduction of tagging tools different from privacy policies), not on a deeper 
questioning of the proportionality of using biometrics to identify one’s friends. Equally, 
trade-offs between privacy and convenience were hardly discussed as Facebook’s 
drawing of an equivalence between privacy and some user control over personal data 
tended to foreclose this discussion. This point is clearly made by the Center for 
Technology and Democracy:  
Facebook has stirred up significant controversy with its face recognition tools, in 
large part because it turned these features on by default ... Users may opt-out of 
tagging on a photo-by-photo basis, but opting out of the system as a whole is 
complicated. Given the steps necessary to delete the face print “summary” data 
associated with each user’s account and the fact that Facebook uses persuasive 
language to try to dissuade users from deleting the data completely, it is unlikely 
most users would go this far (Lynch 2012).  
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Despite the limitations of the focus on a thin idea of user consent, and debate about 
whether privacy laws should focus on preventing the misuse (Mundie 2014), or on 
limiting the collection and retention of personal data (Cavoukian 2014), the Facebook 
case triggered efforts to regulate the use of biometrics in social media and relate them to 
personal data (GAO, 2015). Central to this is the idea of empowering users so that 
biometrics become part of a quid pro quo relationship, where users may consent to have 
their biometrics collected but they will also demand to be able to revoke them and move 
to a different digital ecosystem if they think they are not sufficiently protected, or 
demand the “right to remain anonymous” and to be forgotten, established in EU and 
Californian law (Hadley 2013; Toobin 2014), as well as a “right of reply” as a 
mechanism to re-establish control over information about after it has been disclosed 
(Martin and del Alamo, 2016: 259-62). To assess the degree of protection offered by 
online social networks, companies will have to become more transparent and open 
about how they use personal data and which connections they can establish with the 
information available on user profiles. Such approaches, if adopted, will fundamentally 
change the way people incorporate biometrics into their everyday lives, emphasizing 
transparency and accountability on behalf of users. They do require individuals to be 
more informed and proactive regarding their personal data. While there is some 
skepticism about to what extent individuals are both able and willing to take on these 
tasks (Matzner et al, 2016: 280-7), recent research suggest that young adults, for 
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instance, do care about privacy, and that there is a need to shift the focus of education 
programs away from a focus only on personal safety, to also include issues around 
information security and privacy (Hoofnagle et al, 2010: 20) as an individual as well as 
a social responsibility (Matzner et al, 2016: 302). These findings are confirmed by other 
studies (Quinn 2013), highlighting the crucial role of digital literacy in active 
information control online (Park 2011:233). They also corroborate Nissenbaum’s (2010: 
229) and our approach which positions privacy issues within wider social and other 
contexts from within which existing norms are affirmed or challenged, altered and 
modified, and new norms emerge, constructing new modes of interaction. As we show 
in this article, this approach facilitates an emphasis on the need for citizens to actively 
develop a context-driven approach to privacy once the diffusion of new technologies 
across contexts and its consequences are also incorporated into any discussions on 
privacy.  
 
Conclusion: Traceability and iteration 
At the outset of this article, we suggested that the analysis of the “diffusion effect” in 
the case of the extension of biometric technologies from security to everyday contexts is 
under-developed and insufficiently theorized. We noted several problematic 
presumptions with existing accounts of this effect:  
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▪ The presumption of continuity: both those who are promoting and those critical of 
biometrics, assume that nothing changes in the diffusion process. It is simply a 
matter of one and the same technology being transposed from one context to 
another.  
▪ The presumption that the diffusion effect is uniformly positive, found both in 
governmental and in industry representations of biometrics. 
▪ The presumption that the biometric technologies that are being diffused, are neutral 
in character. 
▪ Finally, the presumption that the process of diffusion itself is apolitical in character. 
To make visible and address the problems with these presumptions, we have argued that 
framings of biometric technologies are not neutral, and that they contribute to creating, 
instituting and maintaining horizons of intelligibility that sets limits to the ways we 
engage with biometrics. Moreover, we have argued that as biometric technologies move 
from practices associated with security and policing to the everyday, accompanying 
discourses are significantly reworked and the meanings of practices are re-signified in 
important ways.  
To fully understand diffusion, we have argued, it is necessary to treat it as an 
iterative practice, where alteration is an integral part of every repetition. Contrary to 
extant views, context here matters in two senses. On the one hand, we have argued that 
contexts of emergence need to be analyzed, as they shape our understandings and uses 
 26 
of biometrics. On the other hand, contexts of iteration are equally important as the 
technology is repeated in contexts and media that are different from the initial use. 
Hence, to expect that technologies will seamlessly carry over from one context to 
another is foolish. To capture contexts of emergence, we analyzed the justifications 
deployed to promote the introduction of biometrics, focusing on securitization and 
economic growth. Nevertheless, these framings ignore the significant changes 
biometrics introduce in the relation between state and citizen, as well as in the relations 
between bodies and technologies, described by Amoore (2006: 338) as the “ubiquitous” 
deployment of the biometric border. Turning to the wider contexts of iteration, 
particularly in industry usage, we found a similarly complex picture: there are some 
aspects of the original framing of biometric technologies that carry over to industry 
representations, but others do not. Continuities compete with discontinuities. 
Accompanying a shift from security to safety is a view of biometrics, not as tool for the 
state to observe and govern the population, but as a positive and much needed tool to be 
used by citizens in their everyday life. This is one clear example of the fact that iteration 
introduces the potential for change, and for doing different things with what seems to be 
the “same” technologies. 
It is precisely in this respect that much of the literature on biometrics fails: 
analysts do not take cognizance of the fact that the diffusion of biometrics exceeds 
security contexts. If they do, they are blinded by the assumption that the context of 
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emergence is dominant and remains so, despite an altered context of use. That is, while 
it is true that there is an ongoing “securitization” of everyday life, there is more to 
diffusion than this. If limited to the assumption of the dominance of the initial context 
of emergence, the strongly dystopic arguments look correct: our lives are increasingly 
securitized, and we have little if any choice in the matter. We live in a surveillance state 
and have become mere docile bodies.  
As we have argued, the situation is considerably more complicated and, as a 
result, potentially promising for citizen rights. This is apparent in our discussion of 
facial biometrics. The introduction of FRT in Facebook took advantage of a horizon of 
intelligibility strongly representing biometrics as technological tools at the service of 
everyone. As a result, it circumvented questions regarding the necessity for such 
technologies in social media, especially as content management tools. Nonetheless, the 
introduction of biometrics without the explicit consent of users, a common practice in 
security contexts, sparked awareness of the diffusion of biometrics, produced as a result 
of a “clash of contexts” (Nissenbaum, 2010: 224). As civil society organizations 
contested the way biometrics is diffused, they also challenge elements of the horizon of 
intelligibility. Most importantly, the proposed solutions call into question deep-seated 
assumptions regarding this particular technology, seeking to empower citizens by 
demanding more control over personal data. Given the iterative nature of diffusion, it is 
possible that the newly emerging practices will leak back to the original contexts of use, 
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mainly security, allowing for a more transparent and controlled use of biometrics by 
citizens.  
The justifications and representations of biometric technologies, in all their 
forms, institute ways of thinking and doing things that seek to govern conduct: the 
conduct of those deploying them, as well as the conduct of those who use biometrics. 
Perhaps the most important shift in this regard is one that we can only glimpse at 
present: a shift from what has been called “societies of surveillance” to “societies of 
traceability.” The former corresponds well to the view that we live in panoptic societies, 
where there is an ever-present state observing our every action and utterance. The recent 
revelations about the US’ PRISM and the UK’s ‘Mastering the Internet’ programs seem 
to confirm this view. We would, however, do well to reflect more closely on the shift in 
the uses of biometrics, and the fact that they now are tools that are used, not by states, 
but by individuals; not in hierarchical relations of surveillance, but in horizontal 
relations of traceability (Chamayou, 2013). What is interiorized through habitual 
diffusion in each case is different. In the case of societies of surveillance, we focus on 
the fact of being observed, while in societies of “dataveillance” the focus is on the 
traceability of people and of things. Face-tagging is but one such an example. As 
Chamayou (2013) puts it, “automatic recording apparatuses” are “integrated into the 
activity itself, every material flow now being coupled with a production of a flow of 
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data.” In this context, traceability “consists in organizing within the present the future 
capability of rereading the past” (Chamayou, 2013).  
The question of the nature of diffusion is not one that can be treated in isolation 
from these monumental changes accompanying the digitization of life through new 
media. These processes, while they continue to be available to scrutiny from above, also 
institute a wide range of new relations between citizens, things, media organizations and 
institutions, captured in large part by attention to “information flows”. What we are 
certain of, is that every diffusion involves new affordances. We ignore this at our peril. 
This is particularly clear when we give attention to how informational flows are altered, 
and accepted norms and practices challenged by the diffusion of new developments 
around technologies such as face recognition and its deployment in online social 
networks as well as in wider spheres of public life. Attention to changes in information 
flows will alert us to areas of possible controversy, where the public as well as civil 
society groups will play an increasingly important role in developing mechanisms for 
understanding and responding to an increasingly complicated network of activities that 
affect our lives and the uses made of personal data. There is a long way to go before 
users are entitled to know what data are being collected about them, by whom and for 
what purposes, and for which they can give authorization in an informed fashion.21 
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1 Introna and Nissembaum (2009) is a notable exception to surveillance-driven 
approaches. 
2
 “Iteration” is understood in the Derridean sense, as a practice of repetition that 
involves a degree of alteration in every repetition (Derrida, 1977). 
3
 Governments and transnational institutions, industry and civil society organizations all 
engage in practices of governance, referring to “the way in which the conduct of 
individuals or groups might be directed” (Tully, 2008: 124).  
4
 Tractica (2015) predicts the global biometrics market in consumer device 
authentication, mobile banking and IT systems to be worth $14.9 billion by 2024. 
5
 Accenture (2012) built the Department of Homeland Security US-VISIT program. 
Allevate similarly works closely with law-enforcement, intelligence and government 
agencies.  
6
 Once photos are uploaded, the software recognizes human faces and biometric 
templates are created and stored, allowing Facebook to suggest names for people in the 
photos by comparing their faces with the stored biometric templates. 
https://www.facebook.com/help/www/124970597582337 (Accessed June 23, 2013). 
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7
 https://www.facebook.com/blog/blog.php?post=467145887130 
8
 For a timeline of Facebook’s privacy policy and legal actions against it, see 
https://epic.org/privacy/facebook/ (Accessed May 8, 2015). 
9 These include the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the Center for Digital 
Democracy, Consumer Watchdog, and the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse.  
10
 For detail on the complaint, see: 
https://www.epic.org/privacy/facebook/facebook_and_facial_recognitio.html (Accessed 
December 8, 2013). 
11
 “The … future of privacy cannot be assured solely by compliance with … regulatory 
frameworks; … privacy assurance must … become an organization’s default mode of 
operation.” https://www.privacybydesign.ca/index.php/about-pbd (March 26, 2015).  
12
 Facebook’s founder’s Letter to Shareholders: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/d287954ds1.h
tm. (February 10, 2014).  
13
 Facebook recently changed its data policy, allowing it to track users across the Web. 
(https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/update/; Accessed May 23, 2015)  
14
 We use the term ‘unacknowledged’ rather than ‘unintended’ consequences since 
companies consciously seek to extend their capacity to mine personal data, yet this 
remains unacknowledged.  
 
 40 
                                                                                                                                               
15
 U.S. Senator Franken notes: “In 2010, Facebook enrolled its then-800 million users 
into its facial recognition program, Tag Suggestions … Over the past three years, 
Facebook has leveraged its … billion-strong user base - and its library of 220 billion 
photos - to build a truly extraordinary database of faceprints.” 
https://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2554 (Accessed May 22, 2015) 
16
 Only a third of Europeans “are aware of the existence of a national public authority 
protecting their rights regarding personal data” (Elias, 2014: 181). Nevertheless, as 
people become more conscious of the uses of personal data there is evidence of growing 
disquiet. For instance, 76% of respondents to an UK survey recorded concern about a 
lack of control over how and with whom personal data is shared (Digital Catapult, 2015: 
8). 
17
 Hoofnagle et al (2010:4) notes that high proportions of 18-24 year olds ‘believe 
incorrectly that the law protects their privacy online and offline more than it does.’ 
18
 “Private” here refers to the reasonable expectation that photographs will be available 
only to a limited range of one’s friends, as determined by one’s Facebook privacy 
settings. 
19
 Traditional privacy policies are too complicated and lengthy for the ordinary user to 
make sense of data sharing in the age of big data (Strandburg, 2014). As Barocas and 
Nissenbaum (2014, 57, 59) note, online privacy policies “offered to individuals as 
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unilateral terms-of-service contracts (often dubbed … ‘notice and consent’)” tend to 
turn privacy questions into matters of “mere” implementation, not acknowledging that 
“informed consent itself may no longer be a match for the challenges posed by big data” 
because data moves from place to place and recipient to recipient in unpredictable ways. 
Both notice and consent need to be reworked and contextualized against the backdrop of 
legitimate expectations. 
20
 A class action in Vienna courts followed a similar complaint brought by Schrems 
against Facebook Ireland Ltd. See http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/report.pdf 
(Accessed June 4th, 2015).  
21
 Greenwood et al (2014: 201) calls this “living informed consent”. 
